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Abstract
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. How-
ever, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already
cast votes but may not know the future votes. We introduce a framework, in which manipulators
can see the past votes but not the future ones, to model online coalitional manipulation of sequen-
tial elections, and we show that in this setting manipulation can be extremely complex even for
election systems with simple winner problems. Yet we also show that for some of the most im-
portant election systems such manipulation is simple in certain settings. This suggests that when
using sequential voting, one should pay great attention to the details of the setting in choosing
one’s voting rule.
Among the highlights of our classifications are: We show that, depending on the size of the
manipulative coalition, the online manipulation problem can be complete for each level of the
polynomial hierarchy or even for PSPACE. We obtain the most dramatic contrast to date between
the nonunique-winner and unique-winner models: Online weighted manipulation for plurality is
in P in the nonunique-winner model, yet is coNP-hard (constructive case) and NP-hard (destruc-
tive case) in the unique-winner model. And we obtain what to the best of our knowledge are
the first PNP[1]-completeness and PNP-completeness results in the field of computational social
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choice, in particular proving such completeness for, respectively, the complexity of 3-candidate
and 4-candidate (and unlimited-candidate) online weighted coalition manipulation of veto elec-
tions.
1 Introduction
Voting is a widely used method for preference aggregation and decision-making. In particular, strate-
gic voting (or manipulation) has been studied intensely in social choice theory (starting with the
celebrated work of Gibbard [Gib73] and Satterthwaite [Sat75]) and, in the rapidly emerging area
of computational social choice, also with respect to its algorithmic properties and computational
complexity (starting with the seminal work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89]; see the sur-
veys [FHH10, FHHR09]). This computational aspect is particularly important in light of the many
applications of voting in computer science, ranging from meta-search heuristics for the internet
[DKNS01], to recommender systems [GMHS99] and multiagent systems in artificial intelligence
(see the survey by Conitzer [Con10]).
Most of the previous work on manipulation, however, is concerned with voting where the manip-
ulators know the nonmanipulative votes. Far less attention has been paid (see the related work below)
to manipulation in the midst of elections that are modeled as dynamic processes.
We introduce a novel framework for online manipulation, where voters vote in sequence and the
current manipulator, who knows the previous votes and which voters are still to come but does not
know their votes, must decide—right at that moment—what the “best” vote to cast is. So, while other
approaches to sequential voting are game-theoretic, stochastic, or axiomatic in nature (again, see the
related work), our approach to manipulation of sequential voting is shaped by the area of “online
algorithms” [BE98], in the technical sense of a setting in which one (for us, each manipulative voter)
is being asked to make a manipulation decision just on the basis of the information one has in one’s
hands at the moment even though additional information/system evolution may well be happening
down the line. In this area, there are different frameworks for evaluation. But the most attractive one,
which pervades the area as a general theme, is the idea that one may want to “maxi-min” things—
one may want to take the action that maximizes the goodness of the set of outcomes that one can
expect regardless of what happens down the line from one time-wise. For example, if the current
manipulator’s preferences are Alice > Ted > Carol > Bob and if she can cast a (perhaps insincere)
vote that ensures that Alice or Ted will be a winner no matter what later voters do, and there is no
vote she can cast that ensures that Alice will always be a winner, this maxi-min approach would say
that that vote is a “best” vote to cast.
It will perhaps be a bit surprising to those familiar with online algorithms and competitive analysis
that in our model of online manipulation we will not use a (competitive) ratio. The reason is that
voting commonly uses an ordinal preference model, in which preferences are total orders of the
candidates. It would be a severely improper step to jump from that to assumptions about intensity of
preferences and utility, e.g., to assuming that everyone likes her nth-to-least favorite candidate exactly
n times more than she likes her least favorite candidate.
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Related Work. Conitzer and Xia [XC10a] (see also the related paper by Desmedt and Elkind
[DE10]) define and study the Stackelberg voting game (also quite naturally called, in an earlier paper
that mostly looked at two candidates, the roll-call voting game [Slo93]). This basically is an elec-
tion in which the voters vote in order, and the preferences are common knowledge—everyone knows
everyone else’s preferences, everyone knows that everyone knows everyone else’s preferences, and
so on out to infinity. Their analysis of this game is fundamentally game-theoretic; with such com-
plete knowledge in a sequential setting, there is precisely one (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium,
which can be computed from the back end forward. Under their work’s setting and assumptions, for
bounded numbers of manipulators manipulation is in P, but we will show that in our model even with
bounded numbers of manipulators manipulation sometimes (unless P = NP) falls beyond P.
The interesting “dynamic voting” work of Tennenholtz [Ten04] investigates sequential voting,
but focuses on axioms and voting rules rather than on coalitions and manipulation. Much heav-
ily Markovian work studies sequential decision-making and/or dynamically varying preferences; our
work in contrast is nonprobabilistic and focused on the complexity of coalitional manipulation. Also
somewhat related to, but quite different from, our work is the work on possible and necessary win-
ners. The seminal paper on that is due to Konczak and Lang [KL05], and more recent work includes
[XC08, BHN09, BBF10, Bet10, BD10, CLM+12, BR12, LPR+12]; the biggest difference is that
those are, loosely, one-quantifier settings, but the more dynamic setting of online manipulation in-
volves numbers of quantifiers that can grow with the input size. Another related research line studies
multi-issue elections [XC10b, XCL10, XCL11, XLC11]; although there the separate issues may run
in sequence, each issue typically is voted on simultaneously and with preferences being common
knowledge.
Organization. We first provide the needed preliminaries for (standard and sequential) elections,
manipulation, and scoring rules, and give some background from complexity theory. Then, after
introducing our model of online manipulation formally, we will present some general complexity re-
sults on the problems defined, and also some specific results for online manipulation in natural voting
systems (i.e., for some central scoring rules). Finally, we turn to schedule-robust online manipulation,
a setting in which not even the order of future voters is known to the current manipulator.
2 Preliminaries
Elections. A (standard, i.e., simultaneous) election (C,V ) is specified by a set C of candidates and
a list V , where we assume that each element in V is a pair (v, p) such that v is a voter name and p is
v’s vote. How the votes in V are represented depends on the election system used—we assume, as is
required by most systems, votes to be total preference orders over C. For example, if C = {a,b,c}, a
vote of the form c > a > b means that this voter (strictly) prefers c to a and a to b.
We introduce election snapshots to capture sequential election scenarios as follows. Let C be
a set of candidates and let u be (the name of) a voter. An election snapshot for C and u is spec-
ified by a triple V = (V<u,u,Vu<) consisting of all voters in the order they vote, along with, for
each voter before u (i.e., those in V<u), the vote she cast, and for each voter after u (i.e., those in
Vu<), a bit specifying if she is part of the manipulative coalition (to which u always belongs). That
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is, V<u = ((v1, p1),(v2, p2), . . . ,(vi−1, pi−1)), where the voters named v1,v2, . . . ,vi−1 (including per-
haps manipulators and nonmanipulators) have already cast their votes (preference order p j being cast
by v j), and Vu< = ((vi+1,xi+1),(vi+2,xi+2), . . . ,(vn,xn)) lists the names of the voters still to cast their
votes, in that order, and where x j = 1 if v j belongs to the manipulative coalition and x j = 0 otherwise.
Scoring Rules. A scoring rule for m candidates is given by a scoring vector α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm)
of nonnegative integers such that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ·· · ≥ αm. For an election (C,V ), each candidate c ∈C
scores αi points for each vote that ranks c in the ith position. Let score(c) be the total score of
c ∈ C. All candidates scoring the most points are winners of (C,V ). Some of the most popular
voting systems are k-approval (especially plurality, aka 1-approval) and k-veto (especially veto, aka
1-veto). Their m-candidate, m ≥ k, versions are defined by the scoring vectors (1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
,0, . . . ,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
) and
(1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
,0, . . . ,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
). When m is not fixed, we omit the phrase “m-candidate.”
Manipulation. The (standard) weighted coalitional manipulation problem [CSL07], abbreviated
by E -WCM, for any election system E is defined as follows:
E -Weighted-Coalitional-Manipulation
Given: A candidate set C, a list S of nonmanipulative voters each having a nonnegative
integer weight, a list T of the nonnegative integer weights of the manipulative voters
(whose preferences over C are unspecified), with S∩ T = /0, and a distinguished
candidate c ∈C.
Question: Can the manipulative votes T be set such that c is a (or the) E winner of (C,S∪T )?
Asking whether c can be made “a winner” is called the nonunique-winner model and is the model
of all notions in this paper unless mentioned otherwise. If one asks whether c can be made a “one and
only winner,” that is called the unique-winner model. We also use the unweighted variant, where each
vote has unit weight, and write E -UCM as a shorthand. Note that E -UCM with a single manipulator
(i.e., ‖T‖ = 1 in the problem instance) is the manipulation problem originally studied in [BTT89,
BO91]. Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07] also introduced the destructive variants of these
manipulation problems, where the goal is not to make c win but to ensure that c is not a winner, and
we denote the corresponding problems by E -DWCM and E -DUCM. Finally, we write E -WC 6= /0M,
E -UC 6= /0M, E -DWC 6= /0M, and E -DUC 6= /0M to indicate that the problem instances are required to have
a nonempty coalition of manipulators.
Complexity-Theoretic Background. We assume the reader is familiar with basic complexity-
theoretic notions such as the complexity classes P and NP, the class FP of polynomial-time com-
putable functions, polynomial-time many-one reducibility (≤pm), and hardness and completeness with
respect to ≤pm for a complexity class (see, e.g., the textbook [Pap94]).
Meyer and Stockmeyer [MS72] and Stockmeyer [Sto76] introduced and studied the polynomial
hierarchy, PH =
⋃
k≥0 Σ
p
k , whose levels are inductively defined by Σ
p
0 = P and Σ
p
k+1 = NP
Σpk , and
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their co-classes, Πpk = coΣ
p
k for k ≥ 0. They also characterized these levels by polynomially length-
bounded alternating existential and universal quantifiers.
Lemma 1 (Meyer and Stockmeyer [MS72] and Stockmeyer [Sto76]) For all k ≥ 0, X ∈ Σpk if and
only if there exist a set Y ∈ P and a polynomial p such that for each input x, x ∈ X if and only if
(∃pz1)(∀
pz2) · · · (Qpzk) [(x,z1,z2, . . . ,zk) ∈ Y ],
where (∃pzi) stands for (∃zi : |zi| ≤ p(|x|)), (∀pzi) for (∀zi : |zi| ≤ p(|x|)), Qp = ∃p if k is odd, and
Qp = ∀p if k is even.
For each k ≥ 0, Πpk is characterized analogously by switching ∃p and ∀p.
PNP is the class of problems solvable in deterministic polynomial time with access to an NP oracle,
and PNP[1] is the restriction of PNP where only one oracle query is allowed. Note that
P ⊆ NP∩ coNP ⊆ NP∪ coNP ⊆ PNP[1] ⊆ PNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩Π
p
2 ⊆ Σ
p
2 ∪Π
p
2 ⊆ PH ⊆ PSPACE,
where PSPACE is the class of problems solvable in polynomial space. The quantified boolean formula
problem, QBF, is a standard PSPACE-complete problem. QBFk (Q˜BFk) denotes the restriction of
QBF with at most k quantifiers that start with ∃ (∀) and then alternate between ∃ and ∀, and we
assume that each ∃ and ∀ quantifies over a set of boolean variables. For each k ≥ 1, QBFk is Σpk -
complete and Q˜BFk is Πpk -complete [SM73, Wra76].
3 Our Model of Online Manipulation
The core of our model of online manipulation in sequential voting is what we call the magnifying-
glass moment, namely, the moment at which a manipulator u is the one who is going to vote, is aware
of what has happened so far in the election (and which voters are still to come, but in general not
knowing what they want, except in the case of voters, if any, who are coalitionally linked to u). In
this moment, u seeks to “figure out” what the “best” vote to cast is. We will call the information
available in such a moment an online manipulation setting (OMS, for short) and define it formally
as a tuple (C,u,V,σ ,d), where C is a set of candidates; u is a distinguished voter; V = (V<u,u,Vu<)
is an election snapshot for C and u; σ is the preference order of the manipulative coalition to which
u belongs; and d ∈ C is a distinguished candidate. Given an election system E , define the online
unweighted coalitional manipulation problem, abbreviated by online-E -UCM, as follows:
online-E -Unweighted-Coalitional-Manipulation
Given: An OMS (C,u,V,σ ,d) as described above.
Question: Does there exist some vote that u can cast (assuming support from the manipulators
coming after u) such that no matter what votes are cast by the nonmanipulators
coming after u, there exists some c ∈C such that c ≥σ d and c is an E winner of
the election?
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By “support from the manipulators coming after u” we mean that u’s coalition partners coming
after u, when they get to vote, will use their then-in-hand knowledge of all votes up to then to help
u reach her goal: By a joint effort u’s coalition can ensure that the E winner set will always include
a candidate liked by the coalition as much as or more than d, even when the nonmanipulators take
their strongest action so as to prevent this. Note that this candidate, c in the problem description, may
be different based on the nonmanipulators’ actions. (Nonsequential manipulation problems usually
focus on whether a single candidate can be made to win, but in our setting, this “that person or better”
focus is more natural.)
For the case of weighted manipulation, each voter also comes with a nonnegative integer weight.
We denote this problem by online-E -WCM.
We write online-E -UCM[k] in the unweighted case and online-E -WCM[k] in the weighted case
to denote the problem when the number of manipulators from u onward is restricted to be at most k.
Our corresponding destructive problems are denoted by online-E -DUCM, online-E -DWCM,
online-E -DUCM[k], and online-E -DWCM[k]. In online-E -DUCM we ask whether the given cur-
rent manipulator u (assuming support from the manipulators after her) can cast a vote such that no
matter what votes are cast by the nonmanipulators after u, no c ∈C with d ≥σ c is an E winner of the
election, i.e., u’s coalition can ensure that the E winner set never includes d or any even more hated
candidate. The other three problems are defined analogously.
Note that online-E -UCM generalizes the original unweighted manipulation problem with a sin-
gle manipulator as introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89]. Indeed, their manipulation
problem in effect is the special case of online-E -UCM when restricted to instances where there is just
one manipulator, she is the last voter to cast a vote, and d is the coalition’s most preferred candidate.
Similarly, online-E -WCM generalizes the (standard) coalitional weighted manipulation problem (for
nonempty coalitions of manipulators). Indeed, that traditional manipulation problem is the special
case of online-E -WCM, restricted to instances where only manipulators come after u and d is the
coalition’s most preferred candidate. If we take an analogous approach except with d restricted now
to being the most hated candidate of the coalition, we generalize the corresponding notions for the
destructive cases. We summarize these observations as follows.
Proposition 2 For each election system E , it holds that
1. E -UC 6= /0M ≤pm online-E -UCM,
2. E -WC 6= /0M ≤pm online-E -WCM,
3. E -DUC 6= /0M ≤pm online-E -DUCM, and
4. E -DWC 6= /0M ≤pm online-E -DWCM.
Corollary 3 below follows immediately from the above proposition.
Corollary 3 1. For each election system E such that the (unweighted) winner problem is solvable
in polynomial time, it holds that E -UCM ≤pm online-E -UCM.
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2. For each election system E such that the weighted winner problem is solvable in polynomial
time, it holds that E -WCM ≤pm online-E -WCM.
3. For each election system E such that the winner problem is solvable in polynomial time, it
holds that E -DUCM ≤pm online-E -DUCM.
4. For each election system E such that the weighted winner problem is solvable in polynomial
time, it holds that E -DWCM ≤pm online-E -DWCM.
We said above that, by default, we will use the nonunique-winner model and all the above prob-
lems are defined in this model. However, we will also have some results in the unique-winner
model, which will, here, sharply contrast with the corresponding results in the nonunique-winner
model. To indicate that a problem, such as online-E -UCM, is in the unique-winner model, we write
online-E -UCMUW and ask whether the current manipulator u (assuming support from the manipula-
tors coming after her) can ensure that there exists some c ∈C such that c ≥σ d and c is the unique E
winner of the election.
4 General Results
Theorem 4 1. For each election system E whose weighted winner problem can be solved in poly-
nomial time,1 the problem online-E -WCM is in PSPACE.
2. For each election system E whose winner problem can be solved in polynomial time, the prob-
lem online-E -UCM is in PSPACE.
3. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such that the problem
online-E -UCM is PSPACE-complete.
4. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time weighted winner problem such that
the problem online-E -WCM is PSPACE-complete.
PROOF. The proof of the first statement (which is analogous to the proof of the first statement in
Theorem 5) follows from the easy fact that online-E -WCM can be solved by an alternating Turing
machine in polynomial time, and thus, due to the characterization of Chandra, Kozen, and Stock-
meyer [CKS81], by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial space. The proof of the second
case is analogous.
We construct an election system E establishing the third statement. Let (C,u,V,σ ,d) be a given
input. E will look at the lexicographically least candidate name in C. Let c represent that name string
in some fixed, natural encoding. E will check if c represents a tiered boolean formula, by which we
mean one whose variable names are all of the form xi, j (which really means a direct encoding of a
string, such as “x4,9”); the i, j fields must all be positive integers. If c does not represent such a tiered
formula, everyone loses on that input. Otherwise (i.e., if c represents a tiered formula), let width be
1We mention in passing here, and henceforward we will not explicitly mention it in the analogous cases, that the claim
clearly remains true even when “polynomial time” is replaced by the larger class “polynomial space.”
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the maximum j occurring as the second subscript in any variable name (xi, j) in c, and let blocks be the
maximum i occurring as the first subscript in any variable name in c. If there are fewer than blocks
voters in V , everyone loses. Otherwise, if there are fewer than 1+2 ·width candidates in C, everyone
loses (this is so that each vote will involve enough candidates that it can be used to set all the variables
in one block). Otherwise, if there exists some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ blocks, such that for no j does the variable
xi, j occur in c, then everyone loses. Otherwise, order the voters from the lexicographically least to
the lexicographically greatest voter name. If distinct voters are allowed to have the same name string
(e.g., John Smith), we break ties by sorting according to the associated preference orders within each
group of tied voters (second-order ties are no problem, as those votes are identical, so any order will
have the same effect). Now, the first voter in this order will assign truth values to all variables x1,∗,
the second voter in this order will assign truth values to all variables x2,∗, and so on up to the blocksth
voter, who will assign truth values to all variables xblocks,∗.
How do we get those assignments from these votes? Consider a vote whose total order over C is σ ′
(and recall that ‖C‖≥ 1+2·width). Remove c from σ ′, yielding σ ′′. Let c1 <σ ′′ c2 <σ ′′ · · ·<σ ′′ c2·width
be the 2 ·width least preferred candidates in σ ′′. We build a vector in {0,1}width as follows: The ℓth
bit of the vector is 0 if the string that names c1+2(ℓ−1) is lexicographically less than the string that
names c2ℓ, and this bit is 1 otherwise.
Let bi denote the vector thus built from the ith vote (in the above ordering), 1 ≤ i ≤ blocks. Now,
for each variable xi, j occurring in c, assign to it the value of the jth bit of bi, where 0 represents false
and 1 represents true. We have now assigned all variables of c, so c evaluates to either true or false.
If c evaluates to true, everyone wins, otherwise everyone loses. This completes the specification of
the election system E . E has a polynomial-time winner problem, as any boolean formula, given an
assignment to all its variables, can easily be evaluated in polynomial time.
To show PSPACE-hardness, we ≤pm-reduce the PSPACE-complete problem QBF to the problem
online-E -UCM. Let y be an instance of QBF. We transform y into an instance of the form
(∃x1,1,x1,2, . . . ,x1,k1)(∀x2,1,x2,2, . . . ,x2,k2) · · · (Qℓ xℓ,1,xℓ,2, . . . ,xℓ,kℓ)
[Φ(x1,1,x1,2, . . . ,x1,k1 ,x2,1,x2,2, . . . ,x2,k2 , . . . ,xℓ,1,xℓ,2, . . . ,xℓ,kℓ)]
in polynomial time, where Qℓ = ∃ if ℓ is odd and Qℓ = ∀ if ℓ is even, the xi, j are boolean variables, Φ
is a boolean formula, and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, Φ contains at least one variable of the form xi,∗. This
quantified boolean formula is ≤pm-reduced to an instance (C,u,V,σ ,c) of online-E -UCM as follows:
1. C contains a candidate whose name, c, encodes Φ, and in addition C contains 2 ·max(k1, . . . ,kℓ)
other candidates, all with names lexicographically greater than c—for specificity, let us say their
names are the 2 ·max(k1, . . . ,kℓ) strings that immediately follow c in lexicographic order.
2. V contains ℓ voters, 1,2, . . . , ℓ, who vote in that order, where u = 1 is the distinguished voter
and all odd voters belong to u’s manipulative coalition and all even voters do not. The voter
names will be lexicographically ordered by their number, 1 is least and ℓ is greatest.
3. The manipulators’ preference order σ is to like candidates in the opposite of their lexicographic
order. In particular, c is the coalition’s most preferred candidate.
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This is a polynomial-time reduction. It follows immediately from this construction and the definition
of E that y is in QBF if and only if (C,u,V,σ ,c) is in online-E -UCM.
To prove the last statement, simply let E be the election system that ignores the weights of the
voters and then works exactly as the previous election system. ❑
The following theorem shows that for bounded numbers of manipulators the complexity crawls
up the polynomial hierarchy. The theorem’s proof is based on the proof given above, except we
need to use the alternating quantifier characterization due to Meyer and Stockmeyer [MS72] and
Stockmeyer [Sto76] for the upper bound and to reduce from the Σp2k-complete problem QBF2k rather
than from QBF for the lower bound.
Theorem 5 Fix any k ≥ 1.
1. For each election system E whose weighted winner problem can be solved in polynomial time,
the problem online-E -WCM[k] is in Σp2k.
2. For each election system E whose winner problem can be solved in polynomial time, the prob-
lem online-E -UCM[k] is in Σp2k.
3. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem such that the problem
online-E -UCM[k] is Σp2k-complete.
4. There exists an election system E with a polynomial-time weighted winner problem such that
the problem online-E -WCM[k] is Σp2k-complete.
PROOF. For the first statement, let (C,u,V,σ ,d) be an instance of online-E -WCM[k]. Let u1 = u,
and rename the manipulators after u as u2, . . . ,uk in the order they vote. Thus, (C,u,V,σ ,d) is in
online-E -WCM[k] if and only if there exists some preference order for u1 such that for all preference
orders the nonmanipulators between u1 and u2 (if any) can cast, there exists some preference order
for u2 such that . . . there exists some preference order for uk such that for all preference orders the
nonmanipulators after uk (if any) can cast, the E winner set under the votes just cast contains at least
one candidate c∈C such that c≥σ d. By Lemma 1, this shows that online-E -WCM[k] is in Σp2k, since
E has a polynomial-time solvable winner problem. The proof of the second statement is analogous.
The proofs of the third and fourth statements are analogous to the proofs of the third and fourth
statements in Theorem 4, except with at most k manipulators and reducing from the Σp2k-complete
problem QBF2k rather than from QBF. ❑
Note that the (constructive) online manipulation problems considered in Theorems 4 and 5 are
about ensuring that the winner set always contains some candidate in the σ segment stretching from
d up to the top-choice. Now consider “pinpoint” variants of these problems, where we ask whether
the distinguished candidate d herself can be guaranteed to be a winner (for nonsequential manip-
ulation, that version indeed is the one commonly studied). Denote the pinpoint variant of, e.g.,
online-E -UCM[k] by pinpoint-online-E -UCM[k]. Since our hardness proofs in Theorems 4 and 5
make all or no one a winner (and as the upper bounds in these theorems also can be seen to hold
for the pinpoint variants), they establish the corresponding completeness results also for the pinpoint
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cases. We thus have completeness results for PSPACE and Σp2k for each k ≥ 1. What about the classes
Σp2k−1 and Π
p
k , for each k ≥ 1? We can get completeness results for all these classes by defining
appropriate variants of online manipulation problems. Let OMP be any of the online manipulation
problems considered earlier, including the pinpoint variants mentioned above. Define freeform-OMP
to be just as OMP, except we no longer require the distinguished voter u to be part of the manipulative
coalition—u can be in or can be out, and the input must specify, for u and all voters after u, which
ones are the members of the coalition. The question of freeform-OMP is whether it is true that for
all actions of the nonmanipulators at or after u (for specificity as to this problem: if u is a nonmanip-
ulator, it will in the input come with a preference order) there will be actions (each taken with full
information on cast-before-them votes) of the manipulative coalition members such that their goal of
making some candidate c with c ≥σ d (or exactly d, in the pinpoint versions) a winner is achieved.
Then, whenever Theorem 5 establishes a Σp2k or Σ
p
2k-completeness result for OMP, we obtain a Π
p
2k+1
or Πp2k+1-completeness result for freeform-OMP and for k = 0 manipulators we obtain Π
p
1 = coNP or
coNP-completeness results. Similarly, the PSPACE and PSPACE-completeness results for OMP we
established in Theorem 4 also can be shown true for freeform-OMP.
On the other hand, if we define a variant of OMP by requiring the final voter to always be a
manipulator, the PSPACE and PSPACE-completeness results for OMP from Theorem 4 remain true
for this variant; the Σp2k and Σ
p
2k-completeness results for OMP from Theorem 5 change to Σ
p
2k−1 and
Σp2k−1-completeness results for this variant; and the above Π
p
2k+1 and Π
p
2k+1-completeness results for
freeform-OMP change to Πp2k and Π
p
2k-completeness results for this variant, k ≥ 1.
Finally, as an open direction (and related conjecture), we define for each of the previously con-
sidered variants of online manipulation problems a full profile version. For example, for a given
election system E , fullprofile-online-E -UCM[k] is the function problem that, given an OMS with-
out any distinguished candidate, (C,u,V,σ), returns a length ‖C‖ bit-vector that for each candi-
date d ∈ C says if the answer to “(C,u,V,σ ,d) ∈ online-E -UCM[k]?” is “yes” (1) or “no” (0).
The function problem fullprofile-pinpoint-online-E -UCM[k] is defined analogously, except regard-
ing pinpoint-online-E -UCM[k].
It is not hard to prove, as a corollary to Theorem 5, that:
Theorem 6 For each election system E whose winner problem can be solved in polynomial time,
1. fullprofile-online-E -UCM[k] is in FPΣ
p
2k[O(log n)], the class of functions computable in polyno-
mial time given Turing access to a Σp2k oracle with O(logn) queries allowed on inputs of size n,
and
2. fullprofile-pinpoint-online-E -UCM[k] is in FPΣ
p
2k
tt , the class of functions computable in polyno-
mial time given truth-table access to a Σp2k oracle.
We conjecture that both problems are complete for the corresponding class under metric reduc-
tions [Kre88], for suitably defined election systems with polynomial-time winner problems.
If the full profile version of an online manipulation problem can be computed efficiently, we
clearly can also easily solve each of the decision problems involved by looking at the corresponding
bit of the length ‖C‖ bit-vector. Conversely, if there is an efficient algorithm for an online manipula-
tion decision problem, we can easily solve its full profile version by running this algorithm for each
candidate in turn. Thus, we will state our later results only for online manipulation decision problem.
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Proposition 7 Let OMP be any of the online manipulation decision problems defined above. Then
fullprofile-OMP is in FP if and only if OMP is in P.
5 Results for Specific Natural Voting Systems
The results of the previous section show that, simply put, even for election systems with polynomial-
time winner problems, online manipulation can be tremendously difficult. But what about natural
election systems? We will now take a closer look at important natural systems. We will show that
online manipulation can be easy for them, depending on which particular problem is considered, and
we will also see that the constructive and destructive cases can differ sharply from each other and that
it really matters whether we are in the nonunique-winner model or the unique-winner model. Finally,
in studying the complexity of online manipulation of veto elections, we obtain (as Theorems 12
and 13) what to the best of our knowledge are the first PNP[1]-completeness and PNP-completeness
results in the field of computational social choice.
Theorem 8 1. online-plurality-WCM (and thus also online-plurality-UCM) is in P.
2. online-plurality-DWCM (and thus also online-plurality-DUCM) is in P.
PROOF. For the first part, we describe a polynomial-time algorithm for online-plurality-WCM. On
input (C,u,V,σ ,d), our algorithm checks whether one of the candidates in Γd = {c | c ≥σ d} that has
the very most vote weight so far among the candidates in Γd would, if u and all the manipulators after
u voted for her, have at least as much vote weight as the total vote weight of the nonmanipulators after
u plus the maximum vote weight over all h ∈C with h <σ d currently cast for h. This condition can
be checked in polynomial time,
Why is this algorithm correct? That is, why is it enough to check the above condition? Suppose
this condition holds. Let cˆ be a candidate in Γd that has (or ties for) the most current vote weight
among the candidates in Γd such that the condition holds for cˆ. Then, even if every nonmanipulator
after u votes for some particular candidate, say e, with e <σ d, e cannot have strictly more vote weight
than cˆ, if u and all the manipulators after u vote for cˆ. So, with all the manipulators from u onward
voting for cˆ, the only candidates who could possibly get strictly more vote weight than cˆ are ones that
are in Γd , but even if one or more of those do, we still have satisfied our goal of making at least one
candidate that is “≥σ d” a winner.2
Now suppose the above condition is not met. We must argue that no actions of the remaining
manipulators—even ones that may depend on intervening behavior of the nonmanipulators—can
guarantee that the winner set will always contain some candidate in Γd. So, the successful action of
the remaining nonmanipulators after u is the following: Since the above condition is not met, there is
some candidate b, b <σ d, such that if all nonmanipulators after u vote for b then b has strictly more
vote weight than any candidate a ∈ Γd would have even if all the manipulators from u onward voted
for a. So these nonmanipulators can force the winner set to not include any candidate from Γd , which
means that the manipulators fail their goal.
2This argument does not work in the unique-winner case.
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The proof of the second part is similar in flavor. Suppose we are given an input (C,u,V,σ ,d). If
d is the most preferred candidate in σ , then our destructive goal is impossible to achieve, as some-
one will always win under plurality, thus thwarting the manipulators’ goal of having no winners.
Otherwise (i.e., if d is not the most preferred candidate in σ ),
• let G be the maximum current vote weight among all candidates in {c | c >σ d} and
• let L be the maximum current vote weight among all candidates in {c | c ≤σ d}.
We claim that the manipulators’ destructive goal can be guaranteed if and only if G plus all the vote
weight of u and the remaining manipulators after u is strictly greater than L plus all the vote weight
of the remaining nonmanipulators after u. This can easily be evaluated in polynomial time.
This algorithm is correct, since if this condition holds then we can certainly ensure that none of
the candidates in {c | c≤σ d} are winners, as a candidate achieving a current value of G can do better
than any of them. And if this condition fails, then the nonmanipulators can ignore the manipulators
and all vote for a candidate in {c | c ≤σ d} currently having a vote weight of L, and by doing so will
ensure that that candidate is a winner. ❑
Theorem 8 refers to problems in the nonunique-winner model. By contrast, we now show that
online manipulation for weighted plurality voting in the unique-winner model is coNP-hard in the
constructive case and is NP-hard in the destructive case. This is perhaps the most dramatic, broad
contrast yet between the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model, and is the first such
contrast involving plurality. The key other NP-hardness versus P result for the nonunique-winner
model versus the unique-winner model is due to Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [FHS08],
but holds only for (standard) weighted manipulation for Copelandα elections (0 <α < 1) with exactly
three candidates; for fewer than three both cases there are in P and for more than three both are NP-
complete. In contrast, the P results of Theorem 8 hold for all numbers of candidates, and the NP-
hardness and coNP-hardness results of Theorem 9 hold whenever there are at least two candidates.
Theorem 9 1. The problem online-plurality-DWCMUW is NP-hard, even when restricted to only
two candidates (and this also holds when restricted to three, four, ... candidates).
2. The problem online-plurality-WCMUW is coNP-hard, even when restricted to only two candi-
dates (and this also holds when restricted to three, four, ... candidates).
PROOF. For the first statement, we prove NP-hardness of online-plurality-DWCMUW by a reduction
from the NP-complete problem Partition: Given a nonempty sequence (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) of positive
integers such that ∑zi=1 wi = 2W for some positive integer W , does there exist a set I ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,z}
such that ∑i∈I wi = W ? Let m ≥ 2. Given an instance (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) of Partition, construct an
instance ({c1, . . . ,cm},u1,V,c1 > c2 > · · · > cm,c1) of online-plurality-DWCMUW such that V con-
tains m + z− 2 voters v1, . . . ,vm−2,u1, . . . ,uz who vote in that order. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 2, vi votes
for ci and has weight (m− 1)W − i, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ui is a manipulator of weight (m− 1)wi. If
(w1,w2, . . . ,wz) is a yes-instance of Partition, the manipulators can give (m− 1)W points to both
cm−1 and cm, and zero points to the other candidates. So cm−1 and cm are tied for the most points and
there is no unique winner. On the other hand, the only way to avoid having a unique winner in our
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online-plurality-DWCMUW instance is if there is a tie for the most points. The only candidates that
can tie are cm−1 and cm, since all other pairs of candidates have different scores modulo m− 1. It is
easy to see that cm−1 and cm tie for the most points only if they both get exactly (m−1)W points. It
follows that (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) is a yes-instance of Partition.
For the second part, we adapt the above construction to yield a reduction from Partition to the
complement of online-plurality-WCMUW. Given an instance (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) of Partition, construct
an instance ({c1, . . . ,cm}, û,V,c1 > c2 > · · · > cm,cm) of online-plurality-WCMUW such that V con-
tains m+ z− 1 voters v1, . . . ,vm−2, û,u1, . . . ,uz who vote in that order. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 2, vi has the
same vote and the same weight as above, û is a manipulator of weight 0, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ui has
the same weight as above, but in contrast to the case above, ui is now a nonmanipulator. By the
same argument as above, it follows that (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) is a yes-instance of Partition if and only if
the nonmanipulators can ensure that there is no unique winner, which in turn is true if and only if the
manipulator can not ensure that there is a unique winner. ❑
Theorem 10 For each scoring rule α = (α1, . . . ,αm), online-α-WCM is in P if α2 = αm and is NP-
hard otherwise.
PROOF. If α1 =αm, all candidates are always winners. If α1 >α2 =αm, this is in essence m-candidate
plurality and online-plurality-WCM is in P by Theorem 8. If α2 6= αm, the result follows from the NP-
hardness of α-WCM, which is the main theorem from Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [HH07],
and Corollary 3. ❑
Theorem 11 For each k, online-k-approval-UCM and online-k-veto-UCM are in P.
PROOF. Consider 1-veto. Given an online-1-veto-UCM instance (C,u,V,σ ,d), the best strat-
egy for the manipulators from u onward (let n1 denote how many of these there are) is to mini-
mize maxc<σ d score(c). Let n0 denote how many nonmanipulators come after u. We claim that
(C,u,V,σ ,d) is a yes-instance if and only if d is ranked last in σ or there exists a threshold t such that
1. ∑c<σ d(maxscore(c)⊖ t) ≤ n1 (so those manipulators can ensure that all candidates ranked <σ
d score at most t points), where “⊖” denotes proper subtraction (x⊖ y = max(x− y,0)) and
maxscore(c) is c’s score when none of the voters from u onward veto c, and
2. ∑c≥σ d(maxscore(c)⊖ (t−1))> n0 (so those nonmanipulators cannot prevent that some candi-
date ranked ≥σ d scores at least t points).
For 1-veto under the above approach, in each situation where the remaining manipulators can
force success against all actions of the remaining nonmanipulators, u (right then as she moves) can
set her and all future manipulators’ actions so as to force success regardless of the actions of the
remaining nonmanipulators. For k-approval and k-veto, k ≥ 2, that approach provably cannot work
(as will be explained right after this proof); rather, we sometimes need later manipulators’ actions
to be shaped by intervening nonmanipulators’ actions. Still, the following P-time algorithm, which
works for all k, tells whether success can be forced. As a thought experiment, for each voter v
13
from u onwards in sequence do this: Order the candidates in {c | c ≥σ d} from most to least current
approvals, breaking ties arbitrarily, and postpend the remaining candidates ordered from least to most
current approvals. Let ℓ be k for k-approval and ‖C‖−k for k-veto. Cast the voter’s ℓ approvals for the
first ℓ candidates in this order if v is a manipulator, and otherwise for the last ℓ candidates in this order.
Success can be forced against perfect play if and only if this P-time process leads to success. ❑
In the above proof we said that the approach for 1-veto (in which the current manipulator can set
her and all future manipulators’ actions so as to force success independent of the actions of intervening
future nonmanipulators) provably cannot work for k-approval and k-veto, k ≥ 2. Why not? Consider
an OMS (C,u,V,σ ,d) with candidate set C = {c1,c2, . . . ,c2k}, σ being given by c1 >σ c2 >σ · · ·>σ
c2k, and d = c1. So, u’s coalition wants to enforce that c1 is a winner. Suppose that v1 has already
cast her vote, now it’s v2 = u’s turn, and the order of the future voters is v3,v4, . . . ,v2 j, where all
v2i, 2 ≤ i ≤ j, belong to u’s coalition, and all v2i−1 do not. Suppose that v1 was approving of the
k candidates in C1 ⊆ {c2,c3, . . . ,c2k}, ‖C1‖ = k. Then u must approve of the k candidates in C1, to
ensure that c1 draws level with the candidates in C1 and none of these candidates can gain another
point. Next, suppose that nonmanipulator v3 approves of the k candidates in C3 ⊆ {c2,c3, . . . ,c2k},
‖C3‖= k. Then v4, the next manipulator, must approve of all candidates in C3, to ensure that c1 draws
level with the candidates in C3 and none of these candidates can gain another point. This process is
repeated until the last nonmanipulator, v2 j−1, approves of the candidates in C2 j−1 ⊆ {c2,c3, . . . ,c2k},
‖C2 j−1‖ = k, and v2 j, the final manipulator, is forced to counter this by approving of all candidates
in C2 j−1, to ensure that c1 is a winner. This shows that there can be arbitrarily long chains such that the
action of each manipulator after u depends on the action of the preceding intervening nonmanipulator.
We now turn to online weighted manipulation for veto when restricted to three candidates. We
denote this restriction of online-veto-WCM by online-veto|3-WCM.
Theorem 12 online-veto|3-WCM is PNP[1]-complete.
PROOF. Let C = {a,b,c} and suppose u’s manipulative coalition has the preference order a>σ b>σ c.
Let d denote the distinguished candidate.
The d = c inputs of online-veto|3-WCM have a trivial P algorithm, since all these instances are
positive.
Restricted to the d = a inputs, the problem is NP-hard, which follows from NP-hardness of
veto|3-WCM due to Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07] (who note that their result is valid in the
unique-winner and nonunique-winner models) and Corollary 3. The restricted problem in this case
is also in NP, by the following NP algorithm: Given an instance (C,u,V,σ ,a) of online-veto|3-WCM
satisfying a >σ b >σ c, nondeterministically guess a partition (A,B) of the manipulators from u on-
ward; all voters in A veto b and all voters in B veto c; the nonmanipulators after u veto a; on any such
path, accept if and only if a is a winner.
Restricted to d = b, online-veto|3-WCM is coNP-hard, which follows by a reduction from
Partition to the complement of online-veto|3-WCM: Given an instance (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) of Partition,
where ∑zi=1 wi = 2W > 0, construct an instance (C,u,V,σ ,d) of online-veto|3-WCM as follows. There
is one weight W −1 voter before u vetoing c, u has weight zero, and there are z nonmanipulators after
u having weights w1,w2, . . . ,wz. Now, (w1,w2, . . . ,wz) is a yes-instance of Partition if and only if c
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can be made the unique winner by the nonmanipulators, which in turn is true if and only if there is no
winning strategy for the manipulator to ensure a winner ≥σ b.
Observe that in this case online-veto|3-WCM is also in coNP, by the following NP algorithm
for the complement: Given an instance (C,u,V,σ ,b) of online-veto|3-WCM such that a >σ b >σ c,
nondeterministically guess a partition (A,B) of the nonmanipulators after u; all voters in A veto a and
all voters in B veto b; the manipulators from u onward veto c; on any such path, accept if and only if
c is the unique winner.
This proves the result, since online-veto|3-WCM can in light of the above be written as the union
of an NP-complete and a coNP-complete set that are P-separable.3 ❑
Moving from three to four candidates increases the complexity, namely to PNP-completeness,
and that same bound holds for unlimitedly many candidates. Although this is a strict increase in
complexity from PNP[1]-completeness (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [Kad88, FPS08]),
membership in PNP still places this problem far below the general PSPACE bound from earlier in this
paper.
Theorem 13 online-veto-WCM is PNP-complete, even when restricted to only four candidates.
PROOF. We first show that online-veto-WCM is in PNP. The proof is reminiscent of the proof
for 1-veto in Theorem 11. Let (C,u,V,σ ,d) be a given instance of online-veto-WCM with C =
{c1,c2, . . . ,cm} and c1 >σ c2 >σ · · ·>σ cm. Suppose d = ci. Our PNP algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Compute the minimal threshold t1 such that there exists a partition (Ai+1, . . . ,Am) of the weights
of the manipulators from u onward such that for each j, i+1 ≤ j ≤ m,
maxscore(c j)−∑A j ≤ t1,
where maxscore(c j) is c j’s score when none of the voters from u onward veto c. That is, by
having manipulators from u onward with weights in A j veto c j, the manipulators from u onward
can ensure that none of the candidates they dislike more than d exceeds a score of t1.
2. Compute the minimal threshold t2 such that there exists a partition (A1, . . . ,Ai) of the weights
of the nonmanipulators after u such that for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ i,
maxscore(c j)−∑A j ≤ t2.
That is, if the nonmanipulators after u with weights in A j veto c j, none of the candidates that
the manipulators like as least as much as d exceeds a score of t2.
3. Accept if and only if t1 ≤ t2.
3Sets S1 and S2 are said to be P-separable (see [GS88]) if there exists a polynomial-time computable set T such that
S1 ⊆ T ⊆ S2. (One cannot in our main text change “are P-separable” into “are disjoint,” as then the reasoning used would
become invalid; for example, SAT and SAT are disjoint, and are respectively NP- and coNP-complete, but their union is Σ⋆
and so unless P = NP will not be PNP[1]-complete.)
15
Note that the first two steps of the algorithm can both be done in FPNP by using an NP oracle that
checks whether there exists a partition of the specified kind.
It remains to show that online-veto|4-WCM is PNP-hard. We will reduce from the standard
PNP-complete problem MAXSATASG=, which is the set of pairs of 3cnf formulas4 that have the
same maximal satisfying assignment [Wag87]. To be precise, we will assume that our propositional
variables are x1,x2, . . .. If xn is the largest propositional variable occurring in φ , we often write
φ(x1, . . . ,xn) to make that explicit. An assignment for φ(x1, . . . ,xn) is an n-bit string α such that αi
gives the assignment for variable xi. We will sometimes identify α with the binary integer it repre-
sents. For φ a formula, maxsatasg(φ) is the lexicographically largest satisfying assignment for φ . If
φ is not satisfiable, maxsatasg(φ) is not defined. And we define MAXSATASG= as the set of pairs
of 3cnf formulas (φ(x1, . . . ,xn),ψ(x1, . . . ,xn)) such that φ and ψ are satisfiable 3cnf formulas, and
maxsatasg(φ) = maxsatasg(ψ).
The OMS that we will construct will have four candidates, a >σ b >σ c >σ d, and the distin-
guished candidate will be b. Looking at the PNP algorithm above, we can see that determining whether
the OMS can be manipulated basically amounts to determining whether the nonmanipulator weights
have a “better” partition than the manipulator weights.
So, we will associate formulas with multisets of positive integers, and their satisfying assignments
with subset sums. This already happens in the standard reduction from 3SAT to SUBSETSUM.
However, we also want larger satisfying assignments to correspond to “better” subset sums. In order
to do this, we use Wagner’s variation of the 3SAT to SUBSETSUM reduction [Wag87]. Wagner uses
this reduction to prove that determining whether the largest subset sum up to a certain bound is odd
is a PNP-hard problem.
Lemma 14 Let φ(x1, . . . ,xn) be a 3cnf formula. Wagner’s reduction maps this formula to an instance
(k1, . . . ,kt ,L) of SUBSETSUM with the following properties:
1. For all assignments α , φ [α ] if and only if there exists a subset of k1, . . . ,kt that sums to L+α .
2. For all K such that 2n ≤ K ≤ 2(2n −1), no subset of k1, . . . ,kt sums to L+K.
Proof of Lemma 14. The first claim is immediate from the proof of Theorem 8.1(3) from [Wag87].
For the second claim, note that L +K ≤ L + 2(2n − 1) < L + 6n. In Wagner’s construction, L =
3 · · ·3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
0 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
in base 6, where m is the number of clauses in φ . So, (L+K)’s representation base
6 is 3 · · ·3︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
followed by n digits. It is easy to see from Wagner’s construction that the subset sums
of this form that can be realized are exactly L+ β , where β is a satisfying assignment of φ . Since
K ≥ 2n, K is not even an assignment, and thus no subset of k1, . . . ,kt sums to L+K. ❑ Lemma 14
Let φ(x1, . . . ,xn) and ψ(x1, . . . ,xn) be 3cnf formulas, and consider instance (φ ,ψ) of
MAXSATASG=. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 does not actually occur in φ or ψ .
We will define an OMS (C,u,V,σ ,b) with C = {a,b,c,d} and σ = a > b > c > d such that (φ ,ψ) ∈
4We denote a formula in conjunctive normal form by cnf formula, and a 3cnf formula is a cnf formula with exactly three
literals per clause.
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MAXSATASG= if and only if (C,u,V,σ ,b) is a positive instance of online-veto-WCM. Note that
MAXSATASG= corresponds to optimal solutions being equal, while online-veto-WCM corresponds
to one optimal solution being at least as good as the other. We will first modify the formulas such that
we also look at the optimal solution for one formula being at least as good as the optimal solution for
the other. The following is immediate.
Claim 15 (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG= if and only if φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable and maxsatasg(φ ∧ ψ) ≥
maxsatasg(φ ∨ψ).
It will also be very useful if one of the formulas is always satisfiable. We can easily ensure this
by adding an extra variable that will correspond to the highest order bit of the satisfying assignment.
Recall that x1 does not occur in φ or ψ .
Claim 16 (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG= if and only if φ ∧ψ ∧ x1 is satisfiable and
maxsatasg(φ ∧ψ ∧ x1)≥ maxsatasg(φ ∨ψ ∨ x1).
Now we would like to apply the reduction from Lemma 14 on φ ∧ψ ∧ x1 and φ ∨ψ ∨ x1. But
wait! This reduction is defined for 3cnf formulas, and φ ∨ψ ∨ x1 is not in 3cnf. Since φ and ψ are
in 3cnf, it is easy to convert φ ∨ψ ∨ x1 into cnf in polynomial time. Let g be the standard reduction
from CNF-SAT to 3SAT. We can rename the variables such that g has the following property: For
ξ (x1, . . . ,xn) a cnf formula, g(ξ )(x1, . . . ,xn,xn+1, . . . ,xnˆ) is a 3cnf formula such that nˆ > n and such
that for all assignments α ∈ {0,1}n, ξ [α ] if and only if there exists an assignment β ∈ {0,1}nˆ−n such
that g(ξ )[αβ ].
Let ψ̂(x1, . . . ,xnˆ) = g(φ ∨ψ ∨ x1). Let φ̂ (x1, . . . ,xnˆ) = φ ∧ψ ∧ (x1∨ x1∨ x1)∧ (xnˆ∨ xnˆ∨ xnˆ).
Claim 17 • φ̂ and ψ̂ are in 3cnf and ψ̂ is satisfiable.
• (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG= if and only if φ̂ is satisfiable and maxsatasg(φ̂ )≥ maxsatasg(ψ̂).
Proof of Claim17. From the previous claim we know that if (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG=, then φ ∧ψ∧
x1 is satisfiable and thus φ̂ is satisfiable. Also from the previous claim, if (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG=,
then maxsatasg(φ ∧ψ∧x1)≥maxsatasg(φ ∨ψ∨x1). Let α be the maximal satisfying assignment of
φ ∧ψ ∧ x1. Then α1nˆ−n is the maximal satisfying assignment of φ̂ . Let α ′ be the maximal satisfying
assignment of φ ∨ψ ∨ x1. Then α ′β is the maximal satisfying assignment of ψ̂ for some β . Since
α ≥ α ′, it follows that α1nˆ−n ≥ α ′β .
For the converse, suppose that φ̂ is satisfiable and maxsatasg(φ̂ ) ≥ maxsatasg(ψ̂). Let γ be the
maximal satisfying assignment of φ̂ and let γ ′ be the maximal satisfying assignment of ψ̂ . Then the
length-n prefix of γ is the maximal satisfying assignment of φ ∧ψ ∧ x1 and the length-n prefix of γ ′
is the maximal satisfying assignment of φ ∨ψ ∨ x1. Since γ ≥ γ ′, the n-bit prefix of γ is greater than
or equal to the n-bit prefix of γ ′. ❑ Claim17
We now apply Wagner’s reduction from Lemma 14 to φ̂ and ψ̂ . Let k1, . . . ,kt ,L be the output of
Wagner’s reduction on φ̂ and let k′1, . . . ,k′t ′ ,L′ be the output of Wagner’s reduction on ψ̂ .
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As mentioned previously, we will define an OMS (C,u,V,σ ,b) with C = {a,b,c,d} and σ = a >
b > c > d such that (φ ,ψ) ∈ MAXSATASG= if and only if (C,u,V,σ ,b) is a positive instance of
online-veto-WCM. Because we are looking at veto, when determining the outcome of an election, it
is easiest to simply count the number of vetoes for each candidate. Winners have the fewest vetoes.
For cˆ a candidate, we will denote the total weight of the voters that veto cˆ by vetoes(cˆ).
There are four voters in V<u: one voter of weight L vetoing a, one voter of weight L+ 2L′+
2(2nˆ−1)−∑k′i vetoing b, one voter of weight L′ vetoing c, and one voter of weight L′+2L+2(2nˆ−
1)−∑ki vetoing d. Let u = u1. Vu< consists of t − 1 further manipulators u2, . . . ,ut followed by t ′
nonmanipulators u′1, . . . ,u′t ′ . The weight of manipulator ui is ki and the weight of nonmanipulator u′i
is k′i.
It remains to show that the reduction is correct. First suppose that (φ ,ψ) is in MAXSATASG=.
By Claim 17, this implies that φ̂ and ψ̂ are satisfiable 3cnf formulas such that maxsatasg(φ̂ ) ≥
maxsatasg(ψ̂). Let α = maxsatasg(φ̂ ). We know from Lemma 14 that there exists a subset
of k1, . . . ,kt that sums to L + α . The manipulators corresponding to this subset will veto c, so
that c receives L + α vetoes from the manipulators. The remaining manipulators will veto d,
i.e., d receives (∑ki)− L− α vetoes from the manipulators. After the manipulators have voted,
vetoes(a) = L,vetoes(b) = L + 2L′ + 2(2nˆ − 1)− ∑k′i, vetoes(c) = L′ + L + α , and vetoes(d) =
L′+L+2(2nˆ−1)−α . Since α ≤ 2nˆ−1, vetoes(c)≤ vetoes(d). We will show that no matter how the
nonmanipulators vote, a or b is a winner. Suppose for a contradiction that after the nonmanipulators
have voted, vetoes(a) > vetoes(c) and vetoes(b) > vetoes(c). If that were to happen, there would
be a subset of k′1, . . . ,k′t ′ summing to K such that L+K = vetoes(a) > vetoes(c) = L+ L′+α and
L+2L′+2(2nˆ−1)−K = vetoes(b)> vetoes(c) = L+L′+α . It follows that α < K−L′ < 2(2nˆ−1)
and there exists a subset of k′1, . . . ,k′t ′ that sums to L′+ (K − L′). It follows from Lemma 14 that
K − L′ is a satisfying assignment for ψ̂ . But that contradicts the assumption that maxsatasg(φ̂) ≥
maxsatasg(ψ̂).
The proof of the converse is very similar. Suppose that (φ ,ψ) 6∈ MAXSATASG=. By Claim 17,
ψ̂ is satisfiable. Let α = maxsatasg(ψ̂). By Claim 17, either φ̂ is not satisfiable or maxsatasg(φ̂ )<
α . Suppose the manipulators vote such that c receives K vetoes from some of them. Without loss
of generality, assume all other manipulators veto d, so that d receives (∑ki)−K vetoes from the
manipulators. We know from Lemma 14 that there exists a subset of k′1, . . . ,k′t ′ that sums to L′+α .
After the manipulators have voted, the nonmanipulators will vote such that a receives L′+α vetoes
from the nonmanipulators and the remaining nonmanipulators will veto b, i.e., b receives (∑k′i)−L′−
α vetoes from the nonmanipulators. So, vetoes(a) = L+L′+α , vetoes(b) = L+L′+2(2nˆ −1)−α ,
vetoes(c) = L′+K, and vetoes(d) = L′+2L+2(2nˆ −1)−K. We will show that neither a nor b is a
winner. Since α ≤ 2nˆ−1, vetoes(a)≤ vetoes(b). So it suffices to show that a is not a winner. If a were
a winner, vetoes(a)≤ vetoes(c) and vetoes(a)≤ vetoes(d). This implies that α ≤ K−L ≤ 2(2nˆ−1).
It follows from Lemma 14 that K − L is a satisfying assignment for φ̂ . But that contradicts the
assumption that either φ̂ is not satisfiable or maxsatasg(φ̂ )< α . ❑
Immediately from Theorems 11 and 13, we have that the full profile variants of
online-k-veto-UCM and online-k-approval-UCM are in FP and that fullprofile-online-veto-WCM is
in FPNP.
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6 Uncertainty About the Order of Future Voters
So far, we have been dealing with cases where the order of future voters was fixed and known. But
what happens if the order of future voters itself is unknown? Even here, we can make claims. To
model this most naturally, our “magnifying-glass moment” will focus not on one manipulator u, but
will focus at a moment in time when some voters are still to come (as before, we know who they
are and which are manipulators; as before, we have a preference order σ , and know what votes have
been cast so far, and have a distinguished candidate d). And the question our problem is asking is:
Is it the case that our manipulative coalition can ensure that the winner set will always include d or
someone liked more than d with respect to σ (i.e., the winner set will have nonempty intersection with
{c ∈C | c ≥σ d}), regardless of what order the remaining voters vote in. We will call this problem
the schedule-robust online manipulation problem, and will denote it by SR-online-E -UCM. (We will
add a “[1,1]” suffix for the restriction of this problem to instances when at most one manipulator and
at most one nonmanipulator have not yet voted.) One might think that this problem captures both
a Σp2 and a Π
p
2 issue, and so would be hard for both classes. However, the requirement of schedule
robustness tames the problem (basically what underpins that is simply that exists-forall-predicate
implies forall-exists-predicate), bringing it into Σp2 . Further, we can prove, by explicit construction of
such a system, that for some simple election systems this problem is complete for Σp2 .
Theorem 18 1. For each election system E whose winner problem is in P, SR-online-E -UCM is
in Σp2 .
2. There exists an election system E , whose winner problem is in P, such that SR-online-E -UCM
(indeed, even SR-online-E -UCM[1,1]) is Σp2 -complete.
PROOF. For the first part, note that for each P predicate R, each polynomial p, and each string x, we
have that
(∃py)(∀pz) [R(x,y,z)]⇛ (∀pz)(∃py) [R(x,y,z)]. (1)
Given an input of SR-online-E -UCM, we have to decide whether, regardless of the order of the future
voters, the manipulative coalition can ensure that the winner set will always include the distinguished
candidate d or someone liked more than d with respect to its preference order. Note that manipulators
correspond to existential quantifiers and nonmanipulators correspond to universal quantifiers. By (1),
among any two fixed orders of future voters where in the first order some manipulator precedes some
nonmanipulator and in the second they are swapped (everything else being the same), the former
is the more demanding one. Thus, by repeatedly applying (1), any order of future voters that has all
remaining manipulators first, followed by all remaining nonmanipulators, will be most demanding for
the manipulators. Since schedule robustness requires the manipulators to force success for all possible
orders of future voters, it is enough to require them to force success for such a “most demanding
order.” Since E winners can be determined in polynomial time, this shows that testing whether the
manipulative coalition is successful can be expressed as a Σp2 predicate.
For the second part, we define an election system E as follows. Let R be a P predicate such that
the set
L2 = {x | (∃y : |y|= |x|)(∀z : |z|= |x|) [R(x,y,z)]
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is Σp2-complete. Let (C,V ) be a given election. Similar to the definition of the election system in
the proof of Theorem 4, the lexicographically least candidate in C will specify x by her name; the
lexicographically least voter in V will specify y by her vote; and the lexicographically greatest voter
in V will specify z by her vote. If there are not enough candidates in C to have y and z of length |x| (in
our fixed encoding of votes), everyone loses in E . Otherwise, if R(x,y,z) holds then everyone wins
in E , else everyone loses in E . This completes the specification of election system E . Since R is in P,
E has a polynomial-time winner problem.
The upper bound, SR-online-E -UCM∈ Σp2 , follows immediately from the first part. For the lower
bound, we now define a ≤pm-reduction from the Σp2 -complete problem L2 to SR-online-E -UCM (in-
deed, even to SR-online-E -UCM[1,1]), showing Σp2-hardness of the problem. Given an instance x of
L2 to an instance (C,u,V,σ ,d) of SR-online-E -UCM[1,1] as follows: C contains x as its lexicograph-
ically least candidate and enough dummy candidates, each with a greater name than x; V contains two
voters, a manipulator u and a nonmanipulator v (with u’s name lexicographically smaller than v’s);
the preference order σ is irrelevant, so we fix any order; and it is also irrelevant which candidate is
the distinguished candidate, since all or no one wins in E , so we fix any candidate d.
If x ∈ L2, and u casts a y, |y| = |x|, witnessing that (i.e., u casts a y such that for each z, |z|= |x|,
R(x,y,z)), then d wins if u casts y before v casts z, and the same y makes d win if v casts z before
u casts y. If x 6∈ L2, then no matter which of u and v casts her vote first, no y cast by u can make d
win. ❑
7 Conclusions and Open Questions
We introduced a novel framework for online manipulation in sequential voting, and showed that
manipulation there can be tremendously complex even for systems with simple winner problems. We
also showed that among the most important election systems, some have efficient online manipulation
algorithms but others (unless P = NP) do not. It will be important to, complementing our work,
conduct typical-case complexity studies. We have extended the scope of our investigation by studying
online control [HHR12b, HHR12a] and will also study online bribery.
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